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Asian Rice Policies and WTO Commitments on Domestic Support Under 
Existing and Proposed Doha Round Provisions 
 
Abstract 
We examine current rice policies in four major Asian countries (China, Japan, Korea, 
and Taiwan), their relationship to current WTO disciplines, and to those proposed 
under the Doha negotiations. WTO disciplines have prompted some changes in rice 
policies, but disciplines of domestic support are unlikely to impose serious constraints 
in the future. Using the example of Taiwan, we examine how existing support policies 
could be changed to reduce domestic distortions and satisfy WTO commitments. 
Changing from existing amber box payments to those that would likely qualify for 
inclusion under the blue or green boxes could allow greater market orientation in 




Rice is the staple food and a major crop in Asian countries. Regional production 
accounts for 90 per cent of the world total, but the share of exports is less than 25 per 
cent. The ratio of world exports to production is less than 5 per cent. These figures 
reflect the fact that Asian countries have emphasized self-sufficiency in rice. However, 
the situation has been changing since the WTO was created and the Agreement on 
Agriculture (AoA) was implemented in 1995. Many Asian countries, which did not 
allow imports of rice, were forced to open their markets. This has affected domestic 
policies related to production, structural adjustment and competitiveness. Market price 
support programs have been restricted or changed under AoA requirements. Taiwan, 
for example, has changed its policy objectives from self-sufficiency to achieving a 
better balance between total supply (domestic production plus imports), demand, and 
stocks.  
The latest round of WTO negotiations under the Doha Development Agenda 
(DDA) has been ongoing for over 10 years. It has been difficult to reach a final 
agreement on agriculture in the face of differing national perspectives on such issues 
as food security, environmental protection, and rural development. A 123-page draft 
modalities text was released on December 6, 2008 by Ambassador Crawford Falconer, 
the then chair of the agricultural negotiations. These involve tiered formulas for 
cutting tariffs and trade-distorting subsidies, and related provisions. The purpose of 
this paper is to explore the effects of domestic support reduction proposals in the draft 
modalities on rice policy in four major Asian countries – China, Japan, Korea, and 
Taiwan. The paper draws upon earlier work in this area for a range of countries by   2
Orden et al. (2011).   
The paper is organized into six further sections as follows: a description of the 
AoA and the proposed draft modalities relating to domestic support in the four 
countries; an examination of the evolution of rice policies since 1995; an assessment 
of the domestic support picture revealed by WTO notifications; an evaluation of 
possible changes in domestic support based on the draft modalities; some options for 
rice policy changes in Taiwan; and a summary of conclusions. 
 
II. The agricultural negotiations framework and GATT/WTO modalities 
Agriculture first entered substantively into the General Agreement on Tariffs and 
Trade (GATT) during the Uruguay Round negotiations of 1986-1994. The Agreement 
on Agriculture (AoA) was concluded with the objective “to provide for substantial 
progressive reductions in agricultural support and protection sustained over an agreed 
period of time, resulting in correcting and preventing restrictions and distortions in 
world agricultural markets.” The AoA involves three pillars: market access, domestic 
support, and export competition. These pillars have also been the focus of the 
agricultural negotiations under the Doha Development Agenda.   
1. The Agreement on Agriculture 
The AoA disciplines the most trade-distorting domestic subsidies (amber box) by 
placing a limit on the maximum amount of support measured by the Aggregate 
Measurement of Support (AMS). This includes market price support (measured in a 
way defined in the Agreement) and product-specific and non-product-specific 
payments that are linked to production. Countries that notified a Total AMS (TAMS) 
in their Uruguay Round schedules were required to bind the maximum permitted 
amber box support at that level and implement a phased percentage reduction. 
Product-specific support that is less than an agreed percentage of the value of 
production of the commodity concerned is excluded from the calculation of the 
Current TAMS (CTAMS), as is non-product-specific support that is less than an 
agreed percentage of the total value of agricultural production. The CTAMS is 
required to be less than the Final Bound TAMS (FBTAMS), the assumption being that 
if these are close together there will be an incentive to reform policies in a less 
distorting direction.   
In addition to the amber box, a blue box category was defined for payments that 
involved a limitation on production. Such payments are not included in the CTAMS 
and are not disciplined under the Agreement. A green box category was also defined 
for payments that are considered to be minimally production and trade distorting. This 
includes payments under environmental programs, structural adjustment programs, 
direct payments that are decoupled from current production, and payments under a   3
variety of other programs. 
With respect to market access, the AoA required that bound tariffs be established 
for agricultural products; some modest reductions were made in these. To provide for 
some market access under high tariffs, tariff-rate quotas were introduced under which 
a specified amount of imports is subject to lower or zero tariffs. Export subsidies are 
disciplined through limitations on the total amount of subsidies and the quantity of 
subsidized exports.   
2. The Doha draft modalities for agriculture   
The Doha draft modalities involve further modifications to the rules governing 
domestic support, market access, and export competition. To some extent these 
impose additional restrictions, but also allow greater flexibility. Export subsidies and 
other forms of export assistance are targeted for elimination or control. Under the 
market access provisions countries will be allowed to declare a certain number of 
tariff lines as “sensitive products” for which they can choose to make smaller tariff 
reductions in exchange for a TRQ expansion. Developing countries can identify a 
certain percentage of tariff lines as “special products” exempt from tariff reductions.   
With respect to domestic support, a new concept of the Overall Trade-Distorting 
Domestic Support (OTDS) is defined as the sum of the TAMS, de minimis and blue 
box. A tiered reduction formula is proposed from a base OTDS level. Tiered 
reductions also apply to the TAMS in addition to a binding on total blue box support 
and reductions in de minimis. There are product-specific limits on the AMS and blue 
box payments. Special and differential treatment is provided for developing countries 
and there are provisions for recently-acceded members (RAMs) with differences in 
required reductions, base and implementation periods. The draft modalities for 
agriculture are summarized in Table 1. 
 
Table 1 Summary of domestic support proposals in the draft Doha modalities for 
developed, and developing countries and RAMs 






(1) the Final Bound Total AMS 
(2) 10% the average of total value 
of agricultural production (base 
period=1995-2000) 
(3) max｛average blue box 
payments, 5% of the average total 
value of agricultural production｝ 
Sum of: 
(1) the Final Bound Total AMS 
(2) 20% the average of total value of agricultural production 
(base period=1995-2000 or 1995-2004) 
(3) max｛average blue box payments, 5% of the average total 
value of agricultural production｝ 
OTDS: Tiered 
reduction formula 
z  If OTDS>60 billion, then 
reduction rate shall be 80%. 
z  If 10<OTDS≦60 billion, then 
reduction rate shall be 70%. 
z  If OTDS≦10 billion, then 
reduction rate shall be 55%. 
z  If OTDS>60 billion, then reduction rate shall be 80%×2/3. 
z  If 10<OTDS≦60 billion, then reduction rate shall be 70%×
2/3. 
z  If OTDS≦10 billion, then reduction rate shall be 55%×2/3. 
z  The reductions shall be implemented in nine steps over eight 
years.   4
z  The reductions shall be 
implemented in six steps over 
five years. 
z  Developing country Members with no Final Bound Total 
AMS commitments shall not be required to undertake 
reduction commitments in their Base OTDS. 
Total AMS: Tiered 
reduction formula 
z  If AMS>40 billion, then 
reduction rate shall be 70%. 
z  If 15<AMS≦40 billion, then 
reduction rate shall be 60%. 
z  If OTDS≦15 billion, then 
reduction shall be 45%. 
z  The reductions shall be 
implemented in six steps over 
five years. 
z  If AMS>40 billion, then reduction rate shall be 70%×2/3. 
z  If 15<AMS≦40 billion, then reduction rate shall be 60%×2/3.
z  If OTDS≦15 billion, then reduction shall be 45%×2/3. 




Average of the product-specific 
AMS during the Uruguay Round 
implementation period, 1995-2000.
Choose one of the following methods: 
(a) the average product-specific AMS during the base period; or 
(b) two times the Member's product-specific de minimis level; or
(c) 20 % of the Annual Bound Total AMS   
de minimis  It shall be reduced by no less than 
50 per cent effective on the first 
day of the implementation period. 
z  It shall be reduced by at least two-thirds of the reduction rate 
in three years from the first day of implementation. 
z  Developing country Members with no Final Bound Total 
AMS commitments shall continue to have the same access as 
under their existing WTO obligations to the limits provided 
for product-specific and non-product-specific de minimis. 
z  Other RAMs with Final Bound Total AMS commitments and 
which have existing de minimis levels of 5 per cent shall 
reduce such levels by at least one-third of the reduction rate 
and the timeframe for implementation shall be five years 
longer. 
Source: WTO (2008c). 
 
III. Asian Rice Policies   
Since the AoA entered into force in 1995 there have been some changes in rice 
policies in Japan, Korea, Taiwan, and China. These are now briefly reviewed.   
1. Japan 
At the beginning of 1995, Japan opened its rice market to foreign suppliers 
through a Minimum Access (MA) provision. Imports were increased by 0.8 per cent 
of total consumption until Japan converted the MA to a Tariff Rate Quota (TRQ) 
system in 1999. The out-of-quota tariff rate was set at 341 yen per kg to prohibit 
imports in excess of the MA quantity. The Food Control Law was replaced with the 
Staple Law in 1995, which deregulated rice prices and relaxed government control of 
distribution. In 1998, government procurement of rice at a guaranteed price was 
terminated, being replaced by purchases at market prices for food security 
stock-holding. In the same year, a new rice policy was introduced with three parts: 
rice production adjustment through an acreage control program, direct payments 
through the Japanese Rice Farming Income Stabilization Program (JRIS), and 
liberalization of the distribution system. Eligible rice producers under the JRIS have 
to participate in the acreage control program. The variable payment under the JRIS, 
involving a production limitation, has been notified under the blue box.   5
Further changes in policy were introduced in 2004. Production adjustment was 
changed from controlling acreage to controlling quantity, and planned distribution was 
eliminated. The allocation of conversion payments was decided by local agricultural 
committees to encourage local participation. In addition, rice farmers could choose to 
market their own rice rather than through the Japanese farmers’ association (JA). The 
JA could no longer dominate pricing in the rice market. The government’s role was 
changed from price control to quantity management through stocks, imports, and 
production adjustment. 
In 2007, a new income stabilization program involving direct payments was 
introduced. This only applies to larger farmers, in order to facilitate improvement in 
rice production structure and to reduce blue box payments. In 2011, Japan initiated the 
new Basic Law on Food, Agriculture and Rural Areas, which emphasizes increasing 
the food self-sufficiency ratio. This involves an income stabilization program with a 
combination of a fixed payment and variable payment for individual farm households 
who plant food crops included rice, wheat, barley and soybeans, and participate in the 
production quantity target program. For rice, for example, the fixed payment is 
150,000 yen per hectare, and a variable payment depends on the price difference 
between the previous three-year moving average of market prices and the current 
market price. 
2. Korea 
Korea imported rice under MA from 1995 with the quantity increasing to 308 
thousand tons in 2008. The government purchased domestic rice at a guaranteed price 
from 1984 to 2005. The main reason for terminating the program was that the rice 
AMS had reached over 90 per cent of the FBTAMS. There was very little room for 
raising the guaranteed price or increasing rice purchases. In 2005, the market price 
support policy was replaced by a scheme involving a fixed payment and a variable 
payment. A public rice storage system was also established, similar to the one in Japan 
with government purchases of rice at market prices for food security stock-holding. 
  Direct payments were derived from the integration of those under earlier 
schemes – the Paddy Field Farm Payment program, which was the base for a fixed 
payment of 532,000 won per hectare, and the Rice Income Insurance Payment 
program, which was the base for the variable payment calculated as 85 per cent of the 
difference between a target price and the market price, minus the fixed payment. 
Since the target price was slightly higher than the earlier guaranteed price, the policy 
transition was relatively smooth.   
3. Taiwan 
In Taiwan, the government has had a program for purchasing rice at guaranteed 
prices since 1974. However, the program became increasingly expensive and led to   6
over production. Government was forced to use set-aside and land diversion 
provisions to address the problem. On the one hand rice production is encouraged 
through a guaranteed price; but on the other hand it is discouraged through set-aside 
and diversion payments. In 2010, rice production was 1.45 million tons. Paddy field 
area, fallow area, and diversion area were 255,415, 209,629, and 49,481 hectares, 
respectively. Government expenditure on rice purchases, set-aside, and diversion were 
NT$ 4.2 billion, 9.3 billion, and 1.4 billion, respectively. In order to balance supply 
and demand, the government has raised set-aside payments while accommodating 
increasing rice imports. For example, the set-aside payment was raised from NT$ 
41,000 to NT$ 45,000 per hectare in 2004.   
Although Taiwan was not a member of the WTO until 2002, it first opened its 
domestic rice market to foreign countries in 1995. Under the MA commitment upon 
accession, Taiwan imported 4 per cent of total consumption. With a rapid increase in 
imports, similar to the Japanese experience, Taiwan adopted a TRQ system in 2003. 
Currently, the import quota is 144,720 tones, 35 per cent of which enters the domestic 
market by auction, and the rest is imported by the government. The in-quota tariff for 
rice is zero, and the out-of-quota tariff is NT$ 45 per kg.   
Purchases of rice at guaranteed prices are based on a three-tiered system: planned 
purchase, supplementary purchase, and additional purchase. The quantities and prices 
are shown in Table 2. The sum of the quantities under the three tiers exactly equals 
total production. The weighted average of guaranteed prices is NT$ 20.25 and 20.22 
respectively for the first and second crop plantings in a single year.   
 
Table 2 Price support program for rice in Taiwan 
planned purchase supplementary purchase additional purchase 
Program 
price   quantity price   quantity  price  quantity 
units NT$/kg  kg  NT$/kg  kg  NT$/kg  kg 
1
st  crop  23.00   1,920  20.00   1,200   18.60  3,000 
2
nd  crop  23.00   1,440  20.00    800   18.60  2,360 
Source: COA (2010). 
 
Rice farmers consider the difference between guaranteed price and the market 
price in deciding whether to sell rice to the government. The total purchased quantity 
shown in Table 3 is the main source for food security stocks. Since the government 
absorbs production at the margin, this has the effect of supporting market prices. 
Consequently, the market price is usually located around the supplementary purchase 
guaranteed price level. Recently, government purchased quantity has been below 15 
per cent of domestic production, plus 65 per cent of TRQ imported by government   7
which accounts for 8 per cent of consumption. The sum of these two sources annually 
for government stock-holdings for food security should be equal to three months 
consumption, which is set in the Law of Food Management. 
 










units m.t.  m.t.  %  m.t.  m.t.  m.t. 
2005 1,467,138 210,949  14.38 167,419 39,811  3,718 
2006 1,558,048 245,659  15.77 215,993 29,423  244 
2007 1,363,458 216,180  15.86 172,046 43,199  935 
2008 1,457,175 205,194  14.08 162,956 41,837  401 
2009 1,578,169 182,596  11.57 174,173 8,278  145 
2010 1,451,011 191,050  13.17 172,883 17,571  596 
Source: COA (2010). 
 
Historically, planned and supplementary purchases have co-existed for a long 
time. The additional purchase appeared in 2003 to prevent market prices from falling 
below the average costs of production. It reinforced the determination of the 
government to support farmers’ incomes. Since guaranteed prices have a major impact 
on incomes, there is generally pressure to raise these. The latest example was in 2008, 
when guaranteed prices in the three-tiered government purchase system were all 
raised by NT$ 2 per kg. Although this had the effect of increasing the rice AMS by 
NT$ 283 million, it had a positive impact on food security stocks; supporting farmers’ 
income and the market price. 
In general, Taiwan’s rice policy is based on three pillars: government purchases 
at guaranteed prices, set aside, and imports under the TRQ. These pillars are 
nominally independent, but are connected. For instance, raising the guaranteed price 
for additional purchases would stimulate rice production, and require an increase in 
the set-aside payment to maintain stability. Farmers’ incomes in either case would be 
increased. If there is a TRQ expansion or an out-of-quota tariff reduction and a 
corresponding increase in imports, government purchases would increase and the 
financial burden would rise, set-aside payments would also increase. The implication 
is that it would be difficult to maintain the existing policy if imports are increased 
significantly. If the program of purchasing rice at a guaranteed price were to be 
eliminated, set-aside and diversion policies would also need to be reviewed. If 
farmers’ incomes and food security are to continue to be key objectives, other options 
may need to be examined. 
4. China 
China is the largest country in terms of rice production and consumption. In 2010,   8
its paddy area was 30 million hectares, producing paddy rice of 197 million tons or 
about 30 per cent of the world total. To satisfy the consumption of its huge population, 
the government has targeted the achievement of high output. China is capable of 
maintaining self-sufficiency in rice. With increasing per capita income, rice 
consumption is shifting from quantity to quality and diversity. Correspondingly, the 
government implemented a structural improvement policy at the end of 1990’s to 
enhance high-quality rice production. An earlier procurement policy based on a single 
grade of “early India paddy” was replaced in 2000 by one with tiered purchase prices 
to encourage farmers to produce higher-quality rice. 
China implemented a new food policy in 2001, creating certain areas as market 
sales area, eliminating the purchases of fixed quantities from farmers and price 
controls, and establishing others as protected production areas, in which more 
interventionist policies are maintained. The market areas, including Zhejiang, 
Shanghai, Fujian, Guangdong, Hainan, Jiangsu, Beijing, and Tianjin, are located in 
the coastal region where much of China’s rapid economic development has been 
taking place. The protected production areas, including Heilongjiang, Liaoning, and 
Jilin, are located in the northeast region. In this region state-owned grain bureaus 
make purchases at guaranteed prices, provide subsidies for risk management, and 
there is public investment in infrastructure to stimulate food production. The new 
policy has changed the market shares of the two regions and increased the share of 
medium size Japonica rice. The government also began to reduce agricultural taxes 
and implemented a minimum price procurement program in 2004, before totally 
eliminated the tax in 2006. As a result China has moved away from taxation to 
support, although since the price under the minimum price procurement program is 
lower than the market price no support purchases have actually been triggered.   
In 2008, China both imported and exported rice: 330 thousand and 970 thousand 
tons, respectively. The WTO import commitment is through a TRQ. The quota was 
increased from 3,325 thousand tons to 5,320 thousand tons in 2004. The state-owned 
grain bureaus import 50 per cent of the import quota. The in-quota tariff is 1 per cent 
and the out-of-quota tariff is 65 per cent. With respect to exports, China committed to 
the elimination of export subsidies on agricultural products in 2004, but still has some 
regulations for exports, including controls on exports and export taxes.   
5. Comparisons 
A comparative summary of rice policies in China, Japan, Korea, and Taiwan is 
given in Table 4. Although there are different policy features and instruments, 
measures can be categorized under market price support, direct payments, import 
controls, and input subsidies or taxes. Policy objectives explicitly focus on food 
sufficiency, price stability, and farmers’ incomes. It is not easy to change existing   9
policies, because of the need to satisfy multiple objectives. This creates complexity in 
managing the policy environment in the context of WTO commitments.   
 
Table 4 Rice policy comparison for four Asian countries 
 Japan Korea Taiwan  China 
Fixed payment  V  V     
Variable payment  V  V     
Government purchase at guaranteed price      V  V 
Food security stock-holding at market price V  V     
Diversion payment  V    V   
Set-aside payment      V   
Tariff Rate Quota (TRQ)  V    V  V 
Minimum Access (MA)    V     
Source: Authors’ assessment. 
 
IV. Analysis of WTO notifications under domestic support commitments   
Support provided to agriculture is supposed to be notified annually to the WTO. 
However, there are often time lags. In this discussion we use both the official 
notifications and some estimates or “shadow notifications” through 2008.   
1. Japan 
Total domestic support payments were 6,185 billion yen in 1996, included green 
box payments of 2,818 billion yen (45%) and amber box payments of 3,367 billion 
yen (55%). After subtracting de minimis, the CTAMS was 3,330 billion yen, which 
was 72 per cent of the FBTAMS. Most of the CTAMS was attributable to government 
purchases of rice at the guaranteed price. The share of rice in the CTAMS reached 76 
percent in 1997. Given such increases market price support policy had to change. The 
Japanese government substituted the JRIS program for the price support policy in 
1998, for which a variable payment and a fixed payment was notified as blue box and 
green box, respectively. The first blue box payment was 51.2 billion yen. The CTAMS 
was reduced significantly to 767 billion yen, and green box payments were increased 
slightly to 3,002 billion yen. 
Since 1998 the rice AMS has almost disappeared, and blue box payments have 
been maintained around 70 billion yen. Blue box payments were further reduced to 32 
billion yen in 2007. Notified green box payments decreased from 3,001 billion yen to 
1,887 billion yen in 2008. The main reason for this was a reduction in expenditure on 
infrastructural services for the agricultural sector and rural areas. Green box payments 
have also included expenditures for public stockholding for food security purposes, 
school lunch programs, and environmental programs.     10
 
Table 5 Summary of notifications of domestic support for Japan, 2002-2008 




Year  1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
Green  box  2,818 2,652 3,002 2,686 2,595 2,295 2,275 2,086 2,098 1,916 1,802 1,796 1,887
Blue box  0  0  51.2 92.7 92.7 91.1 86.5 68.2 67.8 65.3  70.1  42.4  32.4
Final  Bound  Total  AMS  4,635 4,470 4,304 4,138 3,9723 3,9723 3,9723 3,9723 3,9723 3,973 3,973 3,973 3,973
Current Total AMS  3,330  3,171  767 748 709 667 730 642 608 593  571  509  511
Rice AMS  2,557  2,398  42 0 0 0 0 0 7.5 7.5  2.3   
Total value   
of rice production 
3,054 2,779 2,515 2,376 2,321 2,228 2,172 2,342 1,991 1,947 1,815 1,790 1,901
Rice AMS/ production value 84  86  1.67 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.38 0.39  0.13   
Product-specific  
AMS de minimis 
11.4 11.7 53.1 10.4 10.8 12 23.2 16.9 24.1 23.2 18.6 15.4 15.4
Non-product-specific  
AMS de minimis 
25.9 24.4 22.4 22.2 20.9 20.1 20.4 18.1 17 18.1  19 18.0 73.5
Amber Box  3,367  3,207  842 780 740 699 774 677 649 635  609  542  600
Source: WTO (2008a) and Godo and Takahashi (2011). 
 
2. Korea 
Total domestic notified domestic support in Korea was 8,381 billion won in 1997, 
comprised primarily of green box (5,796 billion won) and amber box (2,584 billion 
won). Korea has Special and Differential Treatment for 38 billion won under 
development programs for investment and input subsidies to poor producers. Green 
box and amber box payments have been kept at ratio of roughly 70: 30. Korea notified 
its support until 2004, but its rice policy changed from 2005. We have estimated its 
domestic support for 2005-2008. 
The CTAMS has been close to the FBTAMS. In 2004, the rice AMS of 137 
billion won was 94 per cent of the CTAMS. Facing pressure to raise guarantee prices, 
Korea followed Japan’s example by terminating market price support for rice in 2005, 
replacing this by a direct payment. However, since there was no production-limiting 
requirement, the variable payment was still notified as AMS. In 2005, the rice AMS 
was reduced to 90 billion won. The variable payment was zero in 2008, because the 
market price plus the fixed payment was higher than the target price. The fixed 
payment was notified as green box and was 62 billion won in 2008, roughly equal to 
that in 2005. 
Green box payments have primarily been composed of infrastructural service 
expenditures, including the irrigation and drainage improvement projects, roads, and 
wholesale agricultural markets, etc. The primary expenditure relating to rice has been 
public stockholding for food security purposes, which amounted to 162 billion won in   11
2004. Such expenditures are expected to increase, because of the establishment of a 
public storage system under which the government purchases rice at market prices. 
 
Table 6 Summary of notifications for domestic support for Korea, 2002-2008 
Unit: billion won 
 Notifications  Shadow  notifications 
Year  1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
Green box  5,796  5,361 5,456 5,054 5,668 6,035 5,689 4,867
Special and Differential Treatment  37.8  41.5 62.1 50.6 66.26 57.45 59.43 54.14  
Blue box       
Final Bound Total AMS  2,029  1,952 1,875 1,798 1,721 1,644 1,567 1,490
Current Total AMS  1,937  1,563 1,552 1,691 1,631 1,550 1,522 1,458 988  525  367 88
Rice AMS  1,884  1,510 1,503 1,647 1,583 1,504 1,476 1,371 901  437  279 0
Total value   
of rice production 
9,193 9,183 10,045 10,505 10,722 9,556 8,836 9,963 8,537 8,406 7,858 9,380
Ratio of rice AMS   
in rice production value (%) 
20.50 16.44 14.96 15.68 14.76 15.74 16.70 13.76 10.55  5.20  3.55 0
Product-specific  
AMS de minimis 
254 258 82 114 177 279 229 106  
Non-product-specific  
AMS de minimis 
393 526 405 413 396 501 414 437  
Amber Box  2,584  2,346 2,039 2,217 2,204 2,331 2,165 2,002        
Source: WTO (2008b) and authors’ calculations. 
 
3. Taiwan 
Although Taiwan was not yet a Member of the WTO, it began to implement the 
AoA in 1995. It did not notify support until it entered the WTO in 2002. The 
framework of agricultural policy in Taiwan was unchanged. Rice policies are still 
based on government purchases at guaranteed prices and set asides. Domestic support 
payments are notified under the amber and green boxes. In 2002, total domestic 
support was NT$ 35 billion, of which 25 per cent was amber box. After subtracting de 
minimis of NT$ 1.6 billion, the CTAMS was NT$ 7.1 billion, which was lower than 
the FBTAMS of NT$ 12.2 billion. 
By 2008, the CTAMS had declined to NT$ 4 billion or 28 per cent of the bound 
level. This situation was quite different from Japan and Korea; their percentages were 
77 per cent and 94 per cent, respectively. This might explain why Taiwan has been 
able to keep the same rice policy. However, the amber box increased to over NT$ 12 
billion in that year, because of a large subsidy on fertilizer. The non-product-specific 
de minimis was about 2.5 per cent of the total value of agricultural production. 
The rice AMS in 2008 was NT$2.77 billion or 70 per cent of the CTAMS. The 
government added an additional purchase program in 2003 and raised guaranteed 
prices by NT$ 2 per kg in 2008. The rice AMS did not increase significantly since the   12
market price increased and the quantity purchased did not rise. 








i i GQ EP GP AMS ,  
where  GPi is the i
th guaranteed price component for planned, supplementary, and 
additional purchases, respectively; EP is the external reference price of NT$ 8.92 per 
kg, which was based on the CIF price of rice imported by Hong Kong in 1990-1992; 
GQi is the actual purchase quantity under the i
th guaranteed price program, equivalent 
to the definition of “eligible production” in the AoA. In fact, GQi is determined by 
farmers who sold paddy rice to the government based on the price difference between 
the guaranteed price and the market price. The larger the price difference, the larger 
the quantity of government purchases kept as stocks for food security, and the larger 
the increase in the rice AMS. The purchased quantity was 205 thousand tons in 2008, 
which was 14 per cent of production.   
  If the market price support policy was replaced by a direct payment, it would 
cause quite different results, depending on whether production-limiting measures 
were used. For example, in Korea, the variable payment applied to total production 
with no production-limiting measures would still affect the rice AMS. In contrast, 
Japan’s variable payment with production limitation can be counted in the blue box. 
 
Table 7 Summary of notifications of domestic support by Taiwan, 2002-2008 
Units: million NT$ 
 Notifications  Shadow 
notifications
Year 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007  2008 
Green box  26,009 26,974 31,767 35,277 28,964 32,198   
Blue box    
Final Bound Total AMS  14,165 14,165 14,165 14,165 14,165 14,165  14,165
Current Total AMS  7,057 7,534 4,758 4,043 4,180 3,650  4,013
Rice AMS  4,539 5,332 2,978 2,418 2,883 2,485  2,768
Total value of rice production  32,018 28,342 27,511 28,140 29,380 26,091  31,363
Ratio of rice AMS   
in rice production value (%) 
14.18 18.81 10.82 8.59 9.81 9.52 8.83
Product-specific AMS de minimis 406 367 318 321 320 294  305
Non-product-specific AMS de minimis 1,173 510 625 1,220 2,512 3,043  8,159
Amber Box  8,637 8,411 5,701 5,585 7,012 6,986  12,477,000
Source: WTO (2010b) and authors’ calculations. 
 
4. China 
China’s notifications date from 1999, before it entered the WTO at the end of   13
2001, but official figures are only available for 1999-2004. Although China is a 
developing country member of the WTO, it is not eligible for Special and Differential 
Treatment and the de minimis of 8.5 per cent is lower than other developing countries. 
Agricultural policies in China are in the process of changing from implicit taxes to 
subsidies. The amber box payment became positive in 2004. The rice AMS was -68 
billion RMB in 1999, due to government purchases at an intervention price of 1.152 
RMB per kg below the external reference price of 2.659 RMB per kg. In 2004, the 
rice AMS was roughly 3 billion RMB, which included the effect of minimum price 
procurement and a subsidy for improved crop strains and seeds (WTO, 2010a). 
Product-specific and non-product-specific de minimis payments have been increasing, 
but since these are far below 8.5 per cent of the value of production they have been 
below the effective limit. Accordingly, China’s CTAMS is zero.   
 
Table 8 Summary of notifications of domestic support in China, 2002-2008 
Unit: million RMB 
 Notifications  Shadow  notifications 
Year  1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
Green box  184,335  207,898 242,332 252,117 257,963 308,493 329,733  359,901  386,473 397,107
Special and   
Differential Treatment 
0  000000  0  00
Blue  box  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Final  Bound  Total  AMS  - - - - - - - - - - 
C u r r e n t   T o t a l   A M S   0  000000  0  00
Rice AMS  -67,966  -67,664 -46,971 -17,331 -12,085 2,741    
Total value   
of rice production 
235,049  203,015 208,249 191,786 204,359 314,890 296,846  312,790  340,211 395,070
Ratio of rice AMS   
in rice production value (%)
    
Product-specific  
AMS de minimis 
-116,138 -93,656 -76,076 -38,772 -27,309 4,195 -  -  - -
Non-product-specific  
AMS de minimis 
700 745 748 235 1,283 1,975 6,358  9,338  13,715 9,776
Amber Box  -115,438  -92,911 -75,328 -38,537 -26,026 6,170
Source: WTO (2010a) and Cheng (2011). 
 
5. Comparison 
  The magnitude of domestic support for agriculture reflects government attitudes 
towards the protection of the sector and farmers’ incomes. Although food security is 
an important issue in Asian countries it is notable that only Taiwan has not notified 
payments for public stockholding in the green box. The amber box notification is due 
to the fact that purchases were not made at market prices. Japan’s conversion 
payments for rice production and Taiwan’s set-aside payment are notified in the green   14
box under “environmental program payments.” Both reduce rice production. In Japan, 
a direct payment is linked to production limitations, which allows it to be notified in 
the blue box. Current rice policies in Taiwan and Korea have not been linked to 
production limitations. Their market price support and direct payments are included in 
the AMS. In Taiwan, subsidies on fertilizer have been growing due to increasing oil 
prices. A summary of the main policy measures and their relationship to the AoA 
boxes is contained in Table 9.   
 
Table 9 Comparison of the structure of WTO domestic support notifications of the four countries   















V   V  
Blue box  Variable payment  V       
Final Bound Total 
AMS  V V  V   
Current Total AMS V  V  V   
Rice AMS  -  V  V  0 
Amber Box 
de minimis level  5%  10%  5%  8.5% 
Product-specific 















Insurance Scheme  V      
Livestock 
insurance program   V   
Input subsidies    V  V  V 
Non-product-specific 
AMS de minimis 
Loan interest 
subsidy   V V  V 
Source: Authors’ assessment based on WTO notifications. 
 
V. Implications of the draft modalities for domestic agricultural support 
The DDA modalities follow the basic framework of the AoA, requiring further 
reductions in the total AMS. However, they also require a reduction in the OTDS 
(sum of CTAMS, de minimis, and blue box payments) as well as the imposition of 
product-specific AMS limits and product/measure-specific limits on blue box 
payments. Accordingly, we assess the implications of the proposals for domestic 
support in the four countries. 
1. Japan   15
As one of the developed country members of the WTO, the Base OTDS of 5,448 
billion yen for Japan includes 10 per cent of the average total value of agricultural 
production for a 1995-2000 base period (983 billion yen) and 5 per cent of the 
production value (492 billion yen - higher than the average blue box payment of 79 
billion yen), and the FBTAMS of 3,973 billion yen. The Base OTDS payment is equal 
to US$ 66 billion and is subject to a reduction of 80 per cent over five years according 
to the tiered reduction formula. This would result in a bound OTDS of 1,090 billion 
yen. In addition, the FBTAMS is equal to US$ 48 billion, which means that it is 
subject to a reduction of 70 per cent over five years, yielding a new FBTAMS of 
1,192 billion yen.   
The Final Bound OTDS is lower than the FBTAMS, so the former is a binding 
constraint. The CTAMS would be further constrained by the deduction of blue box 
and de minimis. Nevertheless, the effective FBTAMS of 968 billion yen is still far 
above the CTAMS of 511 billion yen in 2008 (53 per cent of the effective FBTAMS). 
This suggests that current agricultural polices could remain unchanged under the 
Doha domestic support modalities.   
The uniqueness of Japan’s rice policy inclusion in the blue box should be noted. 
The estimated blue box rice limit is 79 billion yen, which is quite close to the 70 
billion yen in the 2006 notification. Japan has transferred payments into “Programs of 
Direct Payment for Paddy-Field Farming” which focuses on larger farmers instead of 
all farmers, and adopted a “Cross-Crops Management Stabilization program” to 
replace crop-specific income assurance. These adjustments caused a decline of blue 
box payments to 32 billion yen. Although there is no specific Doha requirement to 
reduce blue box payments (beyond the limits imposed by the total or 
crop/measure-specific conditions), this suggest that limitations on the blue box are a 
factor for future rice policy.   
2. Korea 
As a developing country member of the WTO, Korea can choose base periods of 
1995-2000 or 1995-2004 for its support commitments under the proposed modalities. 
It is also eligible to use 20 per cent rather than 10 per cent of the average total value of 
agricultural production in calculating the Base OTDS of 11,417 billion won. The 
modalities require a reduction from the Base OTDS of two-thirds of 55% (37%) over 
eight years, yielding a Final Bound OTDS of 7,231 billion won which is still much 
higher than the sum of the CTAMS and de minimis in recent notifications. This means 
that considerable latitude will exist for maintaining distorting support measures. The 
application of two-thirds of a 45 per cent reduction yields a FBTAMS of 960 billion 
won. The CTAMS in 2004 was higher that this, but Korea changed its rice policy in 
2005, a move which seems to reflect the influence of the domestic support disciplines.   16
It is estimated that the rice AMS fell to zero in 2008, since the market price plus a 
fixed payment was greater than the target price.   
3. Taiwan 
  Taiwan is expected to qualify as a recently acceded member (RAM), which can 
apply the conditions applying to developing countries members in the draft modalities. 
The average total value of agricultural production in the 1995-2000 base period was 
NT$ 295 billion and the Base OTDS is NT$ 88 billion. After the required reduction, 
the Final Bound OTDS is NT$ 56 billion, which is higher than the sum of CTAMS 
and  de minimis (NT$ 12.47 billion) in 2008. This means that current domestic 
agricultural support policies do not have to change. In addition, the reduced FBTAMS 
is NT$ 9.92 billion. The 2008 CTAMS was equal to 40% of this level. The rice AMS 
limit is NT$ 4.28 billion which is calculated from the average rice AMS during the 
base period 2002-2004 as notified to the Committee on Agriculture. The rice AMS of 
NT$ 2.77 billion in 2008 was lower than this limit, but if the market price fell the rice 
AMS could rise. Yang (2007) estimates that the rice AMS would increase by roughly 
NT$ 0.46 billion given a market price decrease of NT$ 1 per kg. In contrast, if market 
prices increased the rice AMS would be decreased. Government purchased quantities 
would also decrease, meaning that the government might not be able to acquire 
sufficient stocks to meet its food security obligations. 
4. China 
  China is a RAM and a developing country member with no scheduled FBTAMS. 
It will not be required to undertake a reduction commitment in a Base OTDS and will 
continue to have the same product-specific and non product-specific de minimis levels. 
The estimated Base OTDS of 600 billion RMB is its Final Bound level. Amber box 
support under de minimis was 6.17 billion RMB in 2004. However, the 
non-product-specific de minimis increased rapidly from 1.97 billion RMB in 2004 to 
9.78 billion RMB in 2008, reflecting increasing agricultural subsidies with economic 
growth. The rice AMS limit of 47.28 billion RMB is calculated as twice the de 
minimis level. As noted, the rice AMS was a positive 2.74 billion RMB in 2004, but 
the minimum procurement price is still slightly below the market price in 2011. China 
still has considerable room to increase subsidies for rice. 
5. Comparisons 
  The draft modalities would not appear to put much pressure on current domestic 
agricultural support and rice policies in these four Asian countries. The sum of the 
CTAMS, de minimis, and blue box payments are far below the proposed Final Bound 
OTDS. The recent CTAMS has been only half of the Final Bound level after reduction 
under the tiered formula. This seems to imply that there will be little pressure to 
change the status quo. A summary comparison for the four countries is shown in Table   17
10. 
 
Table10 Comparison of domestic support in the four countries based on the draft modalities   
Notes: 
1.  China’s current total AMS and rice AMS are in 2004 based on its available notification. 
2.  Rice AMS limits are calculated by the draft modality, that is, Japan is based on de minimis level provided for under Article 
6.4 of the Uruguay Round Agreement on Agriculture, Korea and China are based on two times the Member's 
product-specific de minimis level provided for under Article 6.4 of the Uruguay Round Agreement on Agriculture, and 
Taiwan is based on the average product-specific AMS during the base period notified to the Committee on Agriculture. 
3.  Overall blue box limit is calculated by 2.5 per cent of the average total value of agricultural production in the 1995-2000 
base period on the basis of notifications to the Committee on Agriculture where they exist. 
4.  Rice blue box limits are calculated by the average value of rice blue box in Japan during the 1995-2000 period and with 
notifications to the Committee on Agriculture, and one-for-one rice AMS limits transfer in Korea, Taiwan, and China. 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on the 2008 WTO draft modalities. 
 
  However, the draft modalities not only require overall reductions, but also 
impose product-specific limits. For instance, the blue box limit for rice in Japan is 
78.87 billion yen. Japan began to change its rice policy to direct payments instead of 
market price support from 1998, but the average blue box payment was 76.17 billion 
yen in 1998-2006. Under pressures for reduction, Japan adjusted farmers’ 
qualifications for direct payments in 2007, thereby cutting the total to 32.4 billion yen 
in 2008. This seems to suggest an impact of product-specific blue box limits on the 
rice policy. For the other countries with no current blue box payments, this would 
  Japan Korea  Taiwan China 
units  Billion Yen Billion Won Million NT  Million RMB 
Average total value of agricultural 
production in the 1995-2000 base period 
9,833 37,907 295,047 2,150,200
Average total value of agricultural 
production in the 1995-2004 base period 
- 40,183 283,900  2,400,436
(1) Final Bound Total AMS  3,973 1,371 14,165  - 
(2) 20% or 10% of the average total value of 
agricultural production in the base period 
983 8,037 59,009 480,087
(3) 5% of the average total value of agricultural 
      production in the base period 
492 2,009 14,752 120,022
Average blue box payments in the base period  78.87 0 0  0
Base OTDS=(1)+(2)+(3)  5,448 11,417 87,927  600,109
Reduced Base OTDS  1,090 7,231 55,687  600,109
Reduced Final Bound Total AMS  968 960 9,916  - 
Current Total AMS in 2008
1 511 88 4,013  0
Rice AMS limits
2 1,353 1,868 4,283  47,278
Current rice AMS in 2008
1 0 0 2,768  2,741
Overall blue box limit
3 2,428 7,376  53,755
Rice blue box limit
4 79 1,868 4,283  47,278
Rice current blue box  32.40 0 0  0
Reduced de minimis level    2.5% 6.67% 4.17%  8.5%  18
seem to allow for a one for one transfer of product-specific AMS to the blue box, with 
suitable changes in policy to satisfy blue box conditions. In the Taiwan case, the rice 
AMS limit is NT$ 4.28 billion, which would be the rice blue box limit. Beside this 
opportunity for box shifting, the current rice AMS would still face pressure from the 
limit when market prices fall because of government purchases at guaranteed prices.   
The OTDS defines the maximum allowable level for all kinds of trade-distorting 
payments or subsidies; however, overall blue box limits, product-specific blue box 
limits, the FBTAMS, and product-specific AMS substantially restrict domestic 
support policies. The gradual reduction of the OTDS, general and product or 
measure-specific bindings on the total AMS or blue box and reductions in de minimus 
imply that the room for maneuver will become smaller. Once a domestic support 
payment faces one of the general or product-specific limits this is likely to generate 
pressure for a change in policies. 
 
VI. Rice policy reform under the Doha Development Agenda: the case of Taiwan 
Although we have concluded that the draft modalities for domestic support do 
not require any immediate change in rice policies in the four Asian countries, food 
security considerations could provide a focus for adjustment, in a situation of rising 
world food prices. 
Japan and Korea terminated their policies of purchasing rice at guaranteed prices, 
and replaced these by purchases at market prices to establish a public stock-holding 
system. In contrast, Taiwan continues to rely on a market price support policy. The 
purchased amount varies with market prices, but the system is not well-suited to 
stockholding for food security purposes. In addition, there are often political pressures 
to raise guarantee prices, which is not conducive to meeting WTO commitments or to 
policy reform. Consequently, we examine alternatives to current rice policy with the 
aim of achieving food security objectives and satisfying the draft domestic support 
modalities. Our focus is on the use of direct payments that will meet blue box 
conditions by being linked to production limitations, or being based on fixed, rather 
than current, quantities of production. 
We divide direct payments into two categories: price-based and revenue-based. 
The former are based on the difference between a target price and market price, and 
the latter are based on the difference between a revenue baseline and actual revenue. 
To meet proposed blue box requirements and food security objectives, we examine 
three alternatives. 
1. Price-based direct payment with a fixed purchase amount 
This simplifies the current three-tiered purchase system into a single tier with a 
maximum purchase level from each farm linked to a target price. The direct payment   19
is determined as 85 percent of the difference between the target price and the market 
price times a maximum purchased quantity per hectare. The target price is the same as 
that under the current tier of “planned purchases,” because the government purchased 
quantity is mostly derived from that tier. However, since the fill rate is less than 40 per 
cent of the planned purchase quantity, we reduce the maximum under the proposed 
program to that defined by the “supplementary purchase” in order to provide a more 
realistic target. Keeping the planned guaranteed price at the higher level of that under 
the current government guaranteed price program will help to smooth the change in 
policy.  
Under this alternative, farmers still have right to decide whether or not to sell rice 
to the government, depending on the difference between the target price and the 
market price, just as in the current situation. The government acquires rice from 
farmers at the market price but pays them the difference between the target price and 
market price times the purchased quantity. The advantage of this is that the direct 
payment is only made to farmers who choose to sell rice to the government. If farmers 
have an opportunity to sell rice at a higher price than the target price (e.g., because 
they market high quality rice), they would not get a direct payment from the 
government, which is the same as under the current situation. No farmer would have 
any additional benefit. In addition if the purchased quantity is not sufficient to satisfy 
the level of stock-holding for food security purposes the government has the option of 
buying additional rice at market prices. 
To provide an additional incentive to participate in the program we propose that a 
basic payment be provided to farmers to compensate for the reduction in income from 
the elimination of the current program. This payment would only be made to farmers 
who decide to sell rice to government, and we set the fixed compensation payment to 
be equivalent to 15 per cent of average revenue under the existing program in the base 
period. The percentage could differ according to government preferences on the level 
of compensation to be provided to participating farmers.   
The direct payment per hectare, equal to the sum of variable payment and basic 
payment, is calculated through the following formula: 
{} 1 1 1 0 , % 85 ) ( max BP BP Q P P DP T T + − ⋅ ⋅ − = , 
where DP1 is direct payment per hectare; PT is target price which is equal to the 
guaranteed price for “planned purchases”; P is the market price; QT is the maximum 
purchased quantity per hectare under the “supplementary purchase”, but is actually 
based on the quantity sold to government; BP1 is a fixed basic payment per hectare 
of B R BP ⋅ = % 15 1 , where RB is average revenue per hectare under the existing policy 
in the base period. 
Since a basic payment will be paid to farmers who sell rice to the government,   20
the variable payment is adjusted to avoid double-counting. If the price difference is 
less than the basic payment, the variable payment is zero. In that case the direct 
payment will be equal the basic payment. This follows the approach used in Japan and 
Korea. It means that it is possible that a farmer’s income will be higher than under the 
current policy, but the additional transfer of income does not involve the same level of 
distortion as the existing policy. 
2. Price-based direct payment with participation in a set-aside program 
  With reference to the Japan’s experience, farmers who receive direct payments 
must participate in a production adjustment program. In Taiwan, the Paddy Field 
Fallow and Diversion program is independent of government purchases at guaranteed 
prices. These two programs have resulted in a substitution relationship with 
competing effects on production. However, this can be transformed into 
complementary relationship; that is, qualification for the direct payment is applied to 
those who participate the Paddy Field Fallow and Diversion program. For example, 
farmers could agree to fallow land or divert this during three years; otherwise, he/she 
would not qualify for a direct payment. The requirement would also have a balancing 
effect on production by increasing the utilization of fallow and decreasing the 
utilization of paddy fields.   
The direct payment per hectare under the second alternative is determined by 85 
percent of the price difference between a target price and the market price multiplied 
by production. In addition, the source of stock-holding for food security is 
government purchases of rice in the market. Since the second alternative applies to 
total production, the target price would be set a lower level than the first alternative 
above. Following Japan’s experience, we set the target price as a moving average of 
the market price for the last three years. It will be beneficial to link this to 
developments in the market. If the market price is close to the target price, farmers’ 
incomes will be lower than under the current situation. To offset this, the alternative 
also includes a basic payment to compensate for income loss. As above, we consider a 
basic payment of 15 percent, but in this case it is based on the set-aside payment per 
hectare. Such a specification maintains a strong complementary relationship between 
this approach and the existing program of Paddy Field Fallow and Diversion.   
The direct payment per hectare, which is equal to the sum of variable payment 
and the basic payment, is calculated from the following formula: 
{} 2 2 2 0 , % 85 ) ( max BP BP Q P P DP T + − ⋅ ⋅ − = , 
where DP2 is the direct payment per hectare; PT is the target price – a moving average 
of the last three years’ market price; P is market price; Q is production per hectare; 
BP2 is a fixed basic payment per hectare equal to 15 percent of the set-aside payment. 
3. Revenue-based direct payment with participation in a set-aside program   21
  Follow the experience of the American Average Crop Revenue Election program 
(ACRE) and Japan’s program of Direct Payment for Paddy-Field Farming, the third 
alternative is to replace the price difference in the second option above by a revenue 
stabilizer. This reflects the original purpose of domestic support policy to maintain 
farmers’ income, and overcomes the problem of over-compensation when market 
prices decrease or under-compensation when they increase. The target revenue is set 
through a moving average of revenue per hectare for the last three years. The variable 
payment is 85 percent of the difference between target revenue and actual revenue, 
adjusted for the fixed basic payment which is assumed to be 15 percent of the existing 
set-aside payment.   
The direct payment per hectare under this option is calculated through the 
following formula: 
{ } 3 3 3 0 , % 85 ) ( max BP BP R R DP T + − ⋅ − = ,  
where  DP3 is the direct payment per hectare; R T is target revenue per hectare – 
defined as a moving average of revenue per hectare for the last three years; R is actual 
revenue per hectare; BP3 is the basic fixed payment per hectare equal to 15 percent of 
the current set-aside payment. 
4. Simulation of the policy options using a quantitative model 
  As mention above, current rice policies in Taiwan are based on three pillars: 
government purchase at guaranteed prices, paddy field fallow and diversion programs, 
and the tariff rate quota system. These features are reflected in an econometric model 
of the Taiwanese rice market. In this model the market price is endogenously 
determined by a market-clearing condition, which sets consumption equal to domestic 
production plus imports and changes in stocks. Policy variables for government 
purchases under the guaranteed price program and paddy field fallow and diversion 
programs are incorporated into the estimated supply function; quota and over-quota 
tariffs based on the TRQ system are variables in the import function; and government 
purchases are reflected in the stock function. Further details on the model can be 
found in Yang (2007). The model can reflect farmers’ behavior with respect to 
guaranteed prices, market price, and set-aside payments, and policy effects on market 
price support and government purchases. Based on the supply responses and policy 
effects, we can not only examine the impact of policy reforms on production and 
market price, but also on farmers’ income, stock-holding for food security purposes, 
and government expenditures. The model has been updated using data for 1974 to 
2010.  
  In the current analysis we use 2008-2010 as a base period, and consider the 
dynamic delay and cumulative effects of policy changes that incorporate a three-year 
moving average, presenting results for simulations of the three policy alternatives for   22
the year 2013 (Table 11). 
 
Table 11 Simulation results for direct payments under rice policy reforms in Taiwan 







Base market price  NT$/kg  21.59 21.59  21.59
Base production  Paddy rice tones 1,495,452 1,495,452 1,495,452
Base paddy area  Hectare  253,352 253,352  253,352








20.77 19.53 18.27 
103,780.97
Production  Paddy rice tones 1,451,011 1,327,026 1,024,442  1,024,442
Variable payment  NT$/ha  5,895 3,107 2,991
Basic payment  NT$/ha  19,115 13,500  13,500
Direct payment  NT$/ha  25,010 16,607  16,491
Govn’t purchase  Paddy rice tones 191,050 117,213 200,000 200,000
Rice AMS  NT$ million  2,638 1,650  
Green box payment  NT$ million  1,617 3,653 3,653
Blue box payment  NT$ million  516 2,994  2,973
Govn’t expenditures  NT$ million 4,335 4,422 6,648  6,627
Farmer’s income  NT$/ha  132,235 137,713 120,388  120,272
Source: Authors’ estimates and COA (2010). 
 
The results indicate that the biggest impact of the policy change is to decrease 
the market price, through the removal of the existing market price support. Since the 
first alternative still reserves the tier of planned purchases, it has a smaller impact 
(-9.5%) on market price than the other alternatives (-15.4%), and a smaller effect on 
production. The variable payment under the first alternative is more than the other two, 
due to the higher target price derived from the existing program as discussed above. 
The basic fixed payment of the first alternative is also higher, because it is based on 
average revenue in the base period rather than the set-aside payment as in the other 
alternatives. The target prices, base and percentage of payment could be changed, 
since these are policy variables to be decided by policy-makers. In our analysis we 
have simply used some reasonable values for these variables to compare the different 
alternatives.  
In the first alternative, farmers sell 117 thousand tons of paddy rice to the 
government, which is less than the 200 thousand tons of purchases that have been   23
made in recent years to meet food security objectives. The difference has to be 
purchased from the market; the expenditure of NT$ 1,617 million is notified as a 
green box payment. For expenditures on paddy rice by the government, we assume 
this to be notified as AMS because of the purchases at a planned guaranteed price; 
however the guaranteed price is the sum of a variable payment and the market price. 
If government purchases for food security purposes are made at the market price and 
the variable payment is based on the difference between the target price and the 
market price it would be possible to notify the food security expenditures as green box 
payments. The basic fixed payment could be notified as blue box, since it is paid 
using a fixed price and production in the base period, and based on set-aside. The total 
basic payment of the first alternative is smaller than others, since it only applies to 
farmers who sell rice to the government, rather than to all farmers and harvested area.   
The direct payments, which include the basic payment and the variable payment 
under the second and third options discussed above are notified as blue box payments, 
because they have a production-limiting requirement. The spending for stock-holding 
of 200 thousand tones for food security through purchases at market prices is notified 
as green box. Such an approach has not been challenged with respect to other 
notifications (e.g., Japan), even though such purchases may affect market prices. 
Compared to current policy in 2010 with government spending of NT$ 4,335 
million on purchasing paddy rice at guaranteed prices, where NT$ 2,638 million is 
notified as AMS, the spending of between NT$ 4,422 million and NT$ 6,649 million 
under the three proposed options is higher. Farmers’ income from the first alternative 
is higher than base period by NT$ 10,275, but the other alternatives are lower than in 
the base period. Obviously, the first alternative is particularly beneficial to farmers.   
While all three policy alternatives have advantages, particularly in terms of 
transparency and linkage to food security objectives, it might be difficult to generate 
sufficient support, particularly from farmers, to implement them. Furthermore, 
although the current policy has some market distorting effects, the AMS is not close to 
the WTO binding. In the light of these considerations, it is probable that the current 
rice policy in Taiwan is unlikely to be changed in the short-run. 
 
VII. Conclusions 
Rice is a major food staple in the emerging economies of Asia. Asian rice 
production and trade also represent a large share of the world totals. Governments in 
the region use a range of policies to ensure that sufficient supplies of this important 
commodity are available to their people. Japan, Korea, and Taiwan have adopted 
protective policies for rice. China’s rice policy also seems to be evolving from 
implicit taxation to the subsidization of rice production.   24
Membership of the WTO and its Agreement on Agriculture has already caused 
some rice policy changes. In Japan, government purchases of rice under a guaranteed 
price were replaced by direct payments which include a fixed payment and variable 
payment, notified as green box and blue box, respectively. Box shifting has also 
occurred through changes in Korean rice policy as it came close to its Total AMS 
commitment. A direct payment has been substituted for purchases at a guaranteed 
price, resulting in a transfer of some payments to the green box. A guaranteed price 
policy continues to apply in Taiwan. The main reason is that the rice AMS is less than 
30 percent of the FBTAMS. China has changed its rice policy by introducing a 
minimum price procurement policy, which has transformed its AMS from a negative 
to a positive number, although it remains below the de minimis threshold.   
The proposed domestic support modalities in the Doha negotiations, while 
limiting the room for maneuver to some extent in the provision of domestic support 
for rice, would not seem to require major changes in policies in the short run. 
However, based on domestic considerations of food security and income stabilization, 
there may be arguments for policy reform. Using the example of Taiwan we have 
examined options for the use of direct payments and purchases at market prices to 
meet food security objectives, rather than the existing policy of guaranteed prices. 
Price-based or revenue-based direct payment alternatives could be used. This would 
not only have the advantage of improved targeting to achieve policy objectives but 
would allow a reallocation of support from the amber box to the blue or green boxes, 
thereby helping to satisfy future WTO commitments. 
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